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Abstract. The Android unrestricted application market, being of open
source nature, has made it a popular platform for third-party applica-
tions reaching millions of smart devices in the world. This tremendous
increase in applications with an extensive API that includes access to
phone hardware, settings, and user data raises concerns regarding users
privacy, as the information collected from the apps could be used for pro-
filing purposes. In this respect, this paper focuses on the geolocation data
and analyses five GPS applications to identify the privacy risks if no ap-
propriate safeguards are present. Our results show that GPS navigation
apps have access to several types of device data, while they may allow
for personal data leakage towards third parties such as library providers
or tracking services without providing adequate or precise information
to the users. Moreover, as they are using third-party libraries, they suffer
from the intra-library collusion issue, that could be exploited from ad-
vertising and analytics companies through apps and gather large amount
of personal information without the explicit consent of the user.
Keywords: Android system · GPS navigation app · Geo-location · Pri-
vacy · Profiling · Third-party libraries.
1 Introduction
Personal data protection in the mobile applications ecosystem constitutes an im-
portant challenge from both technical and legal aspects, since the unprecedented
?
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growth in recent years of users carrying smart devices, whereas the corresponding
smart applications may become highly intrusive in terms of users privacy. More
than 7.6 billion mobile connections serving 4.7 billion unique mobile consumers
globally[12], whilst it is expected that by 2020 the mobile subscriptions will cover
almost the 75% of the global population; regarding the smart phones, about 5.8
billions are expected to be used by 2020. At the same time, smart applications
may process large amounts of personal data, such as the users’ location, friend-
ships, habits and interests – thus profiling users. This information can be used
for commercial purposes, including behavioural advertising, although it may go
far beyond this purpose —e.g. to infer a user’s socio-economic class, health sta-
tus or political beliefs. Such privacy issues are further accentuated by the fact
that Internet-of-Things (IoT) solutions (platforms and services) can also be ac-
cessed via mobile apps, as well as that the next generation of mobile networks
technology will realise part of the IoT’s connectivity.
Privacy issues of smart mobile applications Towards implementing be-
havioral advertising, (efficient) tracking mechanisms is a prerequisite for the
ad networks in order to create accurate profiles of the users. Generally, several
tracking mechanisms of different forms exist [6,5]. Probably the most difficult
one to be tackled towards protecting users’ privacy rests with the generation
of a so-called fingerprint of the user —that is, a unique identifier of a device,
operating system, browser version, or other instance that can be read by a web
service when the user browses, allowing the tracking of the user when he visits
several websites belonging to different entities. Fingerprinting was first defined
as browser fingerprinting in [8] and has been subsequently generalized to describe
any unique instance that a device leaves based on, e.g., a specific software that
is installed on the device or the particular device configurations [16]. The diffi-
culty in dealing with fingerprinting rests with the fact that fingerprints are not
based on any client-based storage (such as the case of cookies) and thus sophis-
ticated data protection by design solutions are needed to alleviate the relevant
privacy risks. Especially in the mobile applications ecosystem, behavioral adver-
tising can be upgraded into ubiquitous advertising [15], that is advertisements
will not only be personalised to users’ online profiles, but also to their physical
profiles —e.g., advertisements will be customised to users’ locations, physical or
intellectual activities, etc. [6].
The average smartphone has more than 25 apps installed [23], each having
its own access rights to the device depending on the permissions that the user
grants. The vast majority of the apps utilize third-party libraries —e.g. to provide
integration with social networks or to facilitate the programming procedure via
easily embedding complex functionalities. These libraries obtain the same access
rights with the host app. However, the use of such libraries may pose some risks
for the users’ privacy, since they may, e.g. track the users [22,4]. Moreover, as
it is analysed in [23], the use of several popular libraries by several different
smart apps may result in the so-called intra-library collusion, that is the case
that a single library embedded in several apps on a device may appropriately
combine the set of permissions given by each host app so as to leverage the
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acquired privileges and gather (a possibly large amount of) personal information
without the explicit consent of the user. More specifically, as also stated in [23],
the current Android security model, which does not support the separation of
privileges between apps and the embedded libraries, facilitates the following
relative privacy threats without the user’s consent:
– Libraries may abuse the privileges granted to the host applications.
– Libraries may track the users.
– Libraries may aggregate multiple signals for detailed user profiling.
Moreover, obtaining a valid user’s consent according to corresponding legal pro-
visions, as well as being able to demonstrate its validity, is not trivial in such a
challenging environment (see, e.g.,[14]).
More than half of the apps available on Google Play contain ad libraries
linked to third party advertisers[3] and as being studied through analysis of
many versions of popular Android apps studied in [19], the question whether
privacy issues are being efficiently addressed over time reveal that there is an
increased collection of personally identifiable information across app versions, a
slow adoption of HTTPS to secure the information sent to other parties, and a
large number of third parties being able to link user activity and locations across
apps. Interestingly enough, in [13] it is shown that even in privacy enhancing
technologies such as ad blockers we may encounter privacy issues, since the
analysis therein indicates that neither ad blockers are free of third-party tracking
libraries and permissions to access critical resources on users’ mobile devices.
Our contribution This paper focuses on the privacy issues that occur in appli-
cations providing Navigation through GPS component, motivated by the special
nature of these apps which necessitate access to the current device’s geolocation
data. Our approach is based on analysing the user’s personal data that such ap-
plications process and examining whether this process may pose some (hidden)
risks for user’s privacy. In this direction, we studied five popular GPS navigation
apps on Android devices via performing dynamic analysis in order to id which
personal data —including user’s device identifiers— they process. The dynamic
analysis was carried out by using known appropriate software tools that help
monitor what mobile applications are doing at runtime. We particularly inves-
tigated whether such applications share the personal information they access
with third-parties, due to the existence of third-party libraries. Moreover, we
examined the Android permissions granted to these applications, with the aim
to investigate whether such similar applications require the same permissions or
not. In the process, we also examined the privacy policies of these apps, in terms
of finding out whether the information provided to the users is satisfactory.
Our analysis shows that there is underlying data processing in place, which
could possibly result in data protection risks, especially with respect to data
leakage to third parties for tracking users, since the users are not fully aware of
all these processes taking place at the background. Moreover, discrepancies occur
with respect to the permissions that each application requires; again, since any
such permission actually corresponds to a specific purpose of data processing,
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the relevant information provided to the users is not always adequate. Hence,
this work further reveals the privacy challenges that span the entire mobile
applications ecosystem.
It should be pointed out that the aim of the paper is not to make a compar-
ative study between GPS applications, neither to perform a legal evaluation of
the relevant personal data processing they perform; our aim is to examine, in a
typical scenario of a GPS navigation, which type of personal data processing oc-
curs, so as to subsequently yield useful information on potential data protection
concerns that are in place.
The paper is organized as follows. First, a short discussion of the main legal
provisions is given in Section 2, in conjunction with the presentation of device
identifiers that should be considered as personal data. Section 3 provides a short
overview on the permission model that Android adopts, focusing on the so-called
high-risk permissions in terms of privacy. Section 4 constitutes the main part of
this work, where the results of our dynamic analysis on the corresponding appli-
cations are presented. More precisely, we first describe our testing environment
and the methodology that have been utilized for our dynamic analysis, whilst
we next present the findings of the analysis, as well as a discussion on them.
Finally, conclusion as well as some recommendations, are given in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
The European Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (2016) —known as the General Data
Protection Regulation or GDPR— that applies from May 25th, 2018, constitutes
the main legal instrument for personal data protection in Europe. The GDPR,
which has been adopted in 2016 replacing the previous Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC, results in a harmonization of relevant data processing rules across the
European Union and aims to further protect and empower all EU citizens data
privacy. Although the GDPR is a European Regulation, its territorial scope is
not restricted within the European boundaries, since it applies to all organiza-
tions that process personal data of individuals residing in the European Union,
regardless of the organizations’ location, which can be outside European Union.
The term personal data refers to any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person, that is a person who can be identified; as it is
explicitly stated in the GDPR, an identifiable natural person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier
such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, men-
tal, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person. Personal data
processing means any operation that is performed on personal data, including
the collection, recording, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination, combination and erasure.
The notion of the personal data is quite wide, since special attention needs
to be given whenever some data are being characterized as anonymous, i.e. non–
personal. Indeed, according to the GDPR, although the data should be consid-
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ered as anonymous if the person is no longer identifiable, all the means reasonably
likely to be used to identify the natural person directly or indirectly should be
taken into account towards determining whether a natural person is identifiable
(see also [7]).
In general, device identifiers should be considered as personal data since
they may allow the identification of a user (if possibly combined with other
information). The Android operating system, which is the case considered in
this work, is associated with two identifiers (see, e.g., [21]):
– The Android ID, which is a permanent 64bit randomly generated number.
– The Google Advertising ID (GAID), which is a 32-digit alphanumeric iden-
tifier that can be reset at any time, according to the user’s request.
Other device or network identifiers, such as the medium access control (MAC)
and the Internet protocol (IP) addresses, should also be considered as personal
data.
The GDPR codifies the basic principles that need to be guaranteed when
personal data are collected or further processed and sets specific obligations to
those that process personal data (data controllers/data processors). Any pro-
cessing of personal data requires a lawful basis. In case that such a lawful basis
is the individual’s consent, then consent must meet certain requirements in or-
der to be considered as being sufficient; more precisely, consent means any freely
given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agree-
ment to the processing of his or her personal data must be given by a statement
or a clear affirmative action (art. 4 of the GDPR). As stated in [9], since many
smart apps will need to rely on users’ consent for the processing of certain per-
sonal data, the requirement of consent deserves special attention, in particular
as it relates to the issue of permissions. Unfortunately, users have limited under-
standing of the associated risks of enabling permissions (or access to) in certain
apps, whilst app developers have difficulties in comprehending and appropriately
handling permissions [9]. Moreover, this permissions model does not facilitate
the provision of a legally valid consent for any third-party functionality that
might be integrated into the app (since, in the Android platforms, third-party
libraries inherit the privileges of the host app); hence, a major data protection
risk occurs whenever a third-party library uses personal data for profiling and
targeting, without the user’s consent.
It should be pointed out that, depending on the techniques used, tracking of a
mobile user may fall into the scope of the legal framework of the so-called cookie
provision in the ePrivacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC); this applies only
to the European Union. Again, this cookie provision requires informed consent
for such app behaviour. In any case, the new Regulation that is currently being
prepared in the EU to replace the ePrivacy Directive (the so-called ePrivacy Reg-
ulation), aims at being aligned with the GDPR, also covering new stakeholders
and technologies in the field of electronic communications.
The GDPR sets new rules and obligations for each data controller, i.e. the
entity that, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data. Amongst them, the so-called data protection by
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design and data protection by default constitute important challenges involving
various technological and organisational aspects [1]. According to the Recital
78 of the GDPR, appropriate measures that meet in particular the above two
principles of data protection by design/default
(. . .) could consist, inter alia, of minimising the processing of personal
data, pseudonymising personal data as soon as possible, transparency
with regard to the functions and processing of personal data, enabling
the data subject to monitor the data processing, enabling the controller
to create and improve security features.
In the same Recital, there is also an explicit reference to the producers of the
products, services and applications that are based on the processing of personal
data or process personal data; namely, these stakeholders
(. . .) should be encouraged to take into account the right to data protec-
tion when developing and designing such products, services and applica-
tions and (. . .) to make sure that controllers and processors are able to
fulfill their data protection obligations.
This is the only reference within the GDPR to stakeholders others than the data
controllers or data processors (which are the entities that process personal data
on behalf of the controller). In the mobile ecosystem, application developers or
library providers could lie in this category and thus, even in cases that these
actors are neither data controllers nor data processors (hence, they may not be
directly regulated under the GDPR), they are encouraged to make sure that
controllers and processors are able to fulfill their data protection obligations [9].
3 Permissions of applications
One of the Android system’s core features is that applications are executed in
their own private environment, referred to as a sandbox, being unable to access
resources or perform operations outside of their sandbox that would adversely
impact the system’s security (e.g. by downloading malicious software) or user’s
privacy (e.g. by reading contacts, emails, or any other personal information). An
application must explicitly request the permissions needed either at install-time,
via its AndroidManifest.xml file, or at run-time. Our experimental environ-
ment, as it is discussed next, involved Android version 8.0 (API level 26), as
well as Android Lollipop 5.0.1 (API level 21); therefore, for the first case the
permissions granted to the GPS applications were requested at runtime, whilst
for the second case they were requested at install-time.
The permissions granted to applications are classified to several protection
levels, based on their ability to harm the system or the end-user, out which three
levels affect third-party applications [2]:
1. Normal permissions: these cover areas where the application needs to access
data or resources outside its sandbox, but where there’s low risk to the user’s
privacy or the operation of other applications.
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2. Signature permissions: these are granted only if the application that requests
the permission is signed by the same certificate as the application that defines
the permission.
3. Dangerous permissions: these cover areas where the application wants data
or resources that involve the user’s private information, or could potentially
affect the user’s stored data or the operation of other applications.
4 Dynamic analysis of GPS applications
This section provides the methodology that was followed, along with the results
that have been obtained from the dynamic analysis performed on five popular
GPS applications of the Android platform.
4.1 The testing environment
For our research experiments, we utilized an Android device (Android version
Oreo 8) in which we installed five indicative popular GPS navigation apps which
are available through the Google Play Store, namely: [1] the Google Maps (v.
10.12.1), [2] the Sygic GPS Navigation & Maps (v. 17.7.0), [3] the TomTom GPS
Navigation - Traffic Alerts & Maps (v. 1.17.1), [4] the MAPS.ME (v. 9.0.7) and
[5] the MapFactor GPS Navigation Maps (v. 4.0.109).
To be able to analyse these smart apps, via investigating whether they send
personal data to third parties, as well as to obtain a direct information on po-
tentially privacy–intrusive processes, we utilized the Lumen Privacy Monitor
(Lumen)5, which is a free, privacy–enhancing app with the ability to analyze
network traffic on mobile devices in user space. The Lumen runs locally on the
device and intercepts all network traffic since it inserts itself as a middleware
between apps and the network interface ([18]). Lumen is able to identify personal
data leaks that do not require explicit Android permissions, including software
and hardware identifiers. Therefore, Lumen has been used in several cases by the
research community for analysing potential personal data leakages from Android
devices (see, e.g. [20]).
It should be noted that according to a communication we had with the team
developing Lumen, it is possible that some leaks in our current version of Android
(i.e. 8) may not be detectable, since several apps use obfuscation or encoding to
upload the data, even for location, and not all such mechanisms are supported
in the public version of the Lumen. Therefore, we additionally performed an
analysis through an appropriate module of the Xposed framework6, namely the
Inspeckage Android packet inspector — that is an application with an internal
HTTP server7, which is useful for performing dynamic analysis of Android ap-
plications. Due to practical limitations, the Inspeckage Android packet inspector
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system, namely Android Lollipop 5.0.1; it should be pointed out though that, as
of July 2019, the Lollipop versions have still about 14.5% share combined of all
Android devices accessing Google Play store8. Since the same GPS applications,
with the same embedded libraries, have been installed in both devices, it is ex-
pected that, for both scenarios we investigated, the same third-party domains
collect data (differences may occur in which personal data the applications get
access; for example, Android 8 does not allow applications getting access to the
unique Android ID).
All the experiments took place during February and March 2019. The default
settings were accepted during the installation of all GPS applications, whereas
any permission that was required during their execution was also given.
4.2 Permission analysis of GPS applications
By using the Lumen tool, we observed the permissions that each of the appli-
cation granted. We noticed that all applications asked for several access rights
that are generally considered by the Lumen tool as high or medium risk with re-
spect to user’s privacy, such as the access to external storage and to the existing
accounts on the device; all the permissions that are characterised as high-risk by
Lumen are also considered as dangerous in [2]. We summarize our observations,
focusing explicitly on the so-called high-risk permissions, in Table 1).
Table 1. Dangerous permissions (android.permission.?) obtained by GPS navigation
apps
Permissions Google Maps Sygic TomTom MAPS.ME MapFactor
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION × × × ×
ACCESS FINE LOCATION × × × × ×
READ EXTERNAL STORAGE × × × × ×
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE × × × × ×
CAMERA × ×
GET ACCOUNTS × ×
RECORD AUDIO × ×
READ CONTACTS × × ×
WRITE CONTACTS ×
READ PHONE STATE × ×
It is of interest that, although all the applications provide similar services,
there exist variations on the permissions that each of them requires. Therefore,
the intra-library collusion privacy threat seems to be present; for example, if the
same third-party library is being used by Google Maps and TomTom or Sygic
and TomTom, then such a library will obtain all high-risk permissions that are
shown in Table 1.
8 https://developer.android.com/about/dashboards
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It should be explicitly pointed out that none of these permissions should be
considered, by default, as unnecessary; for example, obviously, having location
permission is prerequisite for GPS apps. Moreover, depending on the services
provided, several other permissions may still be needed. However, it is ques-
tionable whether sufficient information is provided to the users regarding the
necessity of these permissions, as well as whether third-party domains also get
such permissions and have access to device data, as discussed next.
4.3 Data traffic to third-party domains
By using the Lumen monitoring tool, we noticed that, for all GPS applications
studied, there exists data traffic to several domains. With respect to Advertising
Tracking Services (ATS), there exists - based on Lumen’s output - one ATS in
Google Maps, four ATS in Sygic, two ATS in TomTom, six ATS in MAPS.ME
and two ATS in MapFactor. Indicative screenshots from the Lumen tool are
provided in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Data leakages to several domains for the Google Map app, the Sygic app, the
TomTom app, the MAPS.ME app and the Map Factor app respectively.
By combining the outputs derived from both the Lumen and the Inspeckage
tools, we summarize the results regarding the data leakages to several domains
(either ATS or not) in Table 2; note that both first-party and third-party domains
are shown. Based on these outputs, we conclude that, in most cases, the ATS
that are associated with the apps are more than their number that was initially
estimated by the Lumen tool.
We subsequently focused on the exact personal data, including device data,
that are being transmitted to these domains. As explained previously, we utilized
both the Lumen monitoring tool (for an Android 8) and the Inspeckage tool (for
an Android Lollipop device). It should be pointed out that transmission of the
GAID to third-party domains has been captured only by the Inspeckage tool,
due to the encryption that takes place on such transmissions. An indicative
screenshot on the information obtained by the Inspeckage tool is shown in Fig.
2.
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Table 2. Data leakages by GPS navigation apps to several domains (either first or
third-party)

























twitter.com × × ×
doubleclick.net × ×
Fig. 2. Transmission of the GAID to the flurry.com, based on the analysis through
the Inspeckage tool.
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Our analysis illustrated that the GAID, as a unique device identifier, is being
collected by several ATS services - namely by infinario.com (via the Sygic
app), by appsflyer.com (via Sygic and MAPS.ME apps), by twitter.com (via
Sygic, TomTom and MAPS.ME apps), by flurry.com (via the MAPS.ME app),
by windows.net (via Sygic and MapFactor apps) and by crashlytics.com (via
the MAPS.ME app).
Interestingly enough, we noticed that there exist domains which may collect a
combination of personal data due to the fact that are being embedded into several
different apps. For example, the domain crashlytics.com collects the Facebook
ID via the app [2]. Hence, if both apps [2] and [4] are being installed into the
same device, both the GAID and the Facebook ID are being transmitted to this
domain, thus allowing this ATS service linking a device with a social network
user. Ofcourse, it is also possible that such a pair - i.e. GAID and Facebook ID
- are also being sent to an ATS service through a unique app; this is the case,
e.g. of app [4] that sends these data to appsflyer.com. Moreover, it is highly
probable that these domains may also collect user’s information through other
smart apps that are installed into the device, thus further increasing the privacy
risks. For example, again for the Crachlytics tracking service, the Lumen tools
informs us that several apps that are installed in our device also communicate
with this domain; this is shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. The percentage of Sygic’s outgoing traffic corresponding to the crashlytics ser-
vice, as well as an enumeration of other apps in our device communicating with this
service (including the two other GPS apps [2] and [3]).
Apart from the content of the information itself, it is of interest to investigate
whether this information is being transmitted in a secure way - i.e. appropriately
encrypted. To this end, we utilized the Lumen monitoring tool, which also pro-
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vides information on the protocols that the applications use in order to transmit
data to several domains. The output of Lumen indicates that the vast majority
of the output traffic generated by these applications is indeed encrypted through
the HTTPS protocol or the Quic protocol (in case of the Google Maps app). In
two apps, the whole amount of outgoing data is encrypted, whereas in the re-
maining three apps the proportion of the encrypted outgoing traffic ranges from
57% to 68%; these are shown in Fig. 4. Therefore, although we may conclude
that, generally, encryption is in place for protecting the personal data that are
being transmitted, it seems that there is room for improvement in some cases.
Fig. 4. Protocol usage by GPS navigation apps
4.4 Transparency of the processing
With regard to the transparency of the underlying data processing, we studied
the privacy policies of the GPS applications. As of July 2019, the main conclu-
sion is that the information provided therein does not suffice to clarify all the
processes that have been noticed by our above dynamic analysis. For example, in
one case, the privacy policy of the app states (where the name of the organisation
providing the app is being mentioned as Company):
When using the software on certain mobile devices, the Company may
need to access and collect certain details and data from your mobile de-
vice including details of your location (shall include, but not be limited
to country, state, city/town/locality, street). The company collects and
stores such information:
– to inform you about your location;
– to send you notifications or content according to your location;
– to show you content (e.g. images) according to your location;
– to inform you about your goal course;
– to inform you about certain points of interest (e.g. museums, stores,
restaurants, hotels, gasoline stations etc.);
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– to inform you about other users comments on certain points of in-
terest;
– to improve Services.
(...) The Company’s Services may contain features, functionalities and/or
third party offerings that may link you or provide you with certain refer-
ence, functionality or products of third parties (”Other Services”). These
Other Services are provided by the Company only as a convenience. The
Other Services are not controlled by the Company in any way and the
Company is not responsible for the content of any such Other Services,
any link contained therein or for the performance, availability, or quality,
of any Other Service.
Similar statements generally occur in all applications; even in cases that more
details on the data process are given, there is still room for improvement with
respect to the transparency of the processing.
5 Conclusions
In this work we focused on five popular GPS navigation applications for Android
platforms, with the aim to examine whether they suffer from known privacy
issues that are present in the mobile applications ecosystem, taking into account
relevant legal provisions. The main findings of our preliminary analysis can be
summarized as follows:
– It is possible that some GPS applications, taking into account their access
rights, process some personal data in a way that it is questionable if the data
protection by design and by default principles are being met.
– The known privacy threat that rests with the so-called intra-library collusion
seems to exist in GPS applications we tested.
– The information that is provided to the users regarding the relevant under-
lying personal data processing is not always complete or clear; this in turn
weakens the validity of the user’s consent.
– In some cases it is possible that outgoing data generated by these applications
are not encrypted.
The above validates the data protection issues that are present in the mo-
bile applications ecosystem. Although such issues are known to exist for several
types of smart apps (see, e.g. [7,13,19]), the fact that they are also present in
applications processing user’s location has significant importance as it may re-
sult higher privacy violations. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the above
findings do not necessarily constitute an exhaustive list; there is still room for
further analysis of these apps (e.g. via performing static analysis on their source
code) in conjunction with other popular apps that are expected to be present
into a smart device.
From this research, it becomes prominent that much effort should be put
on promoting the data protection by design and by default principles in smart
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applications such as privilege separation strategies for apps and their embed-
ded libraries, proper pseudonymisation techniques, as well as improvement on
personal data policies (both on their content/clarity but on their ease on read-
ability). This way we are taking the right steps to mitigate intra-library collusion
and protect users privacy.
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5. Bujlow, T., Carela-Español, V., Solé-Pareta, J., Barlet-Ros, P.: A Survey on Web
Tracking: Mechanisms, Implications, and Defenses. Proceedings of the IEEE, vol.
105, pp. 1476–1510 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2016.2637878
6. Castelluccia, C.: Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Technical Perspec-
tive. In: Gutwirth S., Leenes R., De Hert P., Poullet Y. (eds) European
Data Protection: In Good Health?, pp. 21–33. Springer, Heidelberg (2012).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2903-2 2
7. Chatzistefanou, V., Limniotis, K.: On the (non-)anonymity of anonymous social
networks. In: Katsikas, S., Zorkadis, V. (eds.) E-Democracy Privacy-Preserving,
Secure, Intelligent E-Government Services, CCIS, Springer, vol. 792, pp. 153–168
(2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71117-1 11
8. Eckersley, P.: How Unique Is Your Web Browser? In: Atallah, M., Hopper, N. (eds.)
10th Int. Symp. on Private Enhancing Technologies (PETS), LNCS, vol. 6205, pp.
1-18. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14527-8 1
9. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security: Privacy and data
protection in mobile applications - A study on the app development ecosystem and
the technical implementation of GDPR (2017). https://doi.org/10.2824/114584
10. Gervais, A., Filios, A., Lenders, V., Capkun, S.: Quantifying Web Adblocker Pri-
vacy. In: Foley, S. N., Gollmann, D., Snekkenes, E. (eds.) 22nd European Sympo-
sium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), Part II, LNCS, vol. 10493,
pp. 21–42 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66399-9 2
Intra-Library privacy issues on Android GPS navigation apps 15
11. Grammatikakis, K.-P., Ioannou, A., Shiaeles, S., Kolokotronis, N.:
Are cracked applications really free? An empirical analysis on An-
droid devices. 16th IEEE International Conference on Dependable,
Autonomic and Secure Computing (DASC), pp. 730–735 (2018).
https://doi.org/10.1109/DASC/PiCom/DataCom/CyberSciTec.2018.00127
12. GSM Association: Safety, privacy and security across the mo-
bile ecosystem - Key issues and policy implications. https:
//www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GSMA_
Safety-privacy-and-security-across-the-mobile-ecosystem.pdf (2017).
Last accessed 23 Dec 2018.
13. Ikram, M., Kaafar, M. A.: A first look at mobile Ad-Blocking apps. In IEEE
16th Int. Symp. on Network Computing and Applications (NCA), pp. 1–8 (2017).
https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2017.8171376
14. Jesus V., Mustare S.: I Did Not Accept That: Demonstrating Consent in Online
Collection of Personal Data. In: Gritzalis S., Weippl E., Katsikas S., Anderst-
Kotsis G., Tjoa A., Khalil I. (eds) Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business
(TrustBus), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 11711, Springer, Cham (2019).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27813-7 3
15. Krumm, J.: Ubiquitous advertising: The killer application for the
21st century. IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol. 10, pp. 66–73 (2010).
https://doi.org/10.1109/mprv.2010.21
16. Kurtz, A., Gascon, H., Becker, T., Rieck, K., Freiling. F.: Fingerprinting mobile
devices using personalized configurations. In: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PoPETs), vol. 1, pp. 4–19 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1515/popets-
2015-0027
17. Mazel, J., Garnier, R., Fukuda, K.: A comparison of web privacy protection tech-
niques. arXiv:1712.06850v1 [cs.CR] (2017).
18. Razaghpanah, A., Nithyanand, R., Vallina-Rodriguez, N., Sundaresan, S., Allman,
M., Kreibich, C., Gill, P.: Apps, Trackers, Privacy, and Regulators: A Global Study
of the Mobile Tracking Ecosystem. Network and Distributed System Security Sym-
posium (2018).
19. Ren, J., Lindorfer, M., Dubois, D. J., Rao, A., Choffnes, D. and Vallina-Rodriguez,
N.: Bug Fixes, Improvements, ... and Privacy Leaks - A Longitudinal Study of PII
Leaks Across Android App Versions. Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium (2018). https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2018.23159
20. Reyes, I., Wijesekera, P., Razaghpanah, A., Reardon, J., VallinaRodriguez, N.,
Egelman, S., Kreibich, C.: Is our children’s apps learning? automatically detect-
ing coppa violations. IEEE Workshop on Technology and Consumer Protection
(ConPro) (2017).
21. Son, S., Kim, D., Shmatikov, V.: What Mobile Ads Know About Mo-
bile Users. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (2016).
https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2016.23407
22. Stevens, R., Gibler, C., Crussell, J., Erickson, J., Chen, H.: Investigating User
Privacy in Android Ad Libraries. In Workshop on Mobile Security Technologies
(MoST), page 10 (2012).
23. Taylor, V. F., Beresford, A. R., Martinovic, I: Intra-Library Collusion: A Potential
Privacy Nightmare on Smartphones. arXiv:1708.03520v1 [cs.CR] (2017).
24. Wang, W., Wang, X., Feng, W., Liu, J., Han, Z. and Zhang, X.: Exploring
Permission-Induced Risk in Android Applications for Malicious Application Detec-
tion. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 9, pp. 1869–
1882 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2014.2353996
